***********************************************************
“Our Trip over the Northwestern Railroad.”

But a few weeks since, just after the completion of the Northwestern Railroad, connecting the capital of Tennessee with Hickman, on the Mississippi, General Superintendent Innes invited attaches of the several daily papers of this city to accompany an excursion train over the road from Nashville to its western terminus. Owing to the shortness of the notice, and the multiplicity of duties devolving upon all hands in the office, the Press and Times was not represented on that occasion. Finding a little spare time last week, we concluded to take a ride over this road, as much to see the country along its line, as to get a respite from the din and bustle of city life.

Early on Thursday morning we proceeded to the Chattanooga depot, along side of which the train bound West was waiting all who might present themselves as passengers. The sky was clear, and the air quite cool. In fact, there was a heavy frost, the first we has seen this autumn, not only tangible, but visible. At 6 o'clock the stentorian voice of the conductor sang out “all aboard,” when the train slowly moved off, drawn by engine No. 18, otherwise known as the “Gov. Brownlow.” Soon we had traversed that part of the road on stilts over the “lick Branch,” not far above where “the said Hood” played “possum” to the “Injuns,” and lost his scalp, and were rapidly approaching that outer line of battlements, the city soon faded away in the distance, when we found ourself [sic] indeed in the country, breathing its pure air, and enjoying its sublimer scenery – its hills and valleys, fields and forests. “Man made the city, God the country.” Therefore, dear reader, if you be a dweller in the country, repine not at your lot, for “rural felicity” is preferable to the crowded city, with its heartless indifference, its fashion and vanity, stench and dust.

Six and a half miles out, we passed at Bellemead, the first stopping place after leaving the city. Then away we go through that beautiful section of country, so highly improved and so desirable, embracing a model stock farm of Gen. Harding, with its grassy; lawns and stone fences, it comfortable mansion and convenient appendages.

Now we are ten miles out, at Vaughn’s Gap. Another pause, and away we go, through hill and valley, over creek and ravine, passing Bellevue, Smith’s Mills, Newsom, Pegram, Palmer’s Mills, Kingston Springs, Glendale, White Bluff, Burns, Smeedville, McCall, Gillem, McEwen, to Waverly, the county seat of Humphreys county, and sixty-six and a half miles from Nashville. Waverly, though a railroad town, looks rather dilapidated and has been sadly neglected by the painter. It boasts three brick buildings, court-house, church and academy: so we may reasonably infer that the good people of Humphreys are not forgetful of these three cardinal duties – the administration of justice, the worship of God, and the “teaching the young idea how to shoot.” [sic] * The “White House,” where the up-train passengers take dinner, is a new establishment, and furnishes just such meals are hungry mortals are glad to get. Jimmie Noland, the kind and attentive manager of the house, has out thanks for favors extended us. After the delivery of the mails, a small accession of passengers, and away we roll for forty minutes, when we “fetch up” at Johnsonville, environed on one side by barren sand-hills [sic], and on the other by the Tennessee river. It is seventy-eight miles from Nashville, is a railroad town which sprang up during the war, and was named after the “Alderman of Greeneville,” “one of the immortal thirteen,” the then Military Governor of Tennessee, but now His Excellency the President of the United States. Johnsonville enjoys not only railroad facilities, but is accessible by steamboats from the upper and lower Tennessee, and was a great depot for Government stores during the rebellion. We asked a disciple of Roger Sherman the population of the place. He though not more than four hundred! We replied we thought not. Perhaps, including black and white, dogs and all, the number may be two hundred. The “Johnson House, the principal hotel, (and we observed several others,) stands just opposite the depot, perched on a hill side, about as high above the train as a country martin box above a chicken coop. We know nothing of the house, but saw at least one attraction – “the girl with the blue dress on,” but what “de white folks calls her,” deponent sayeth not. Just at 10 o'clock the unbound train came by, giving us the track below, and in a few minutes we had quit Johnsonville and were moving slowly over the Tennessee river bridge, a Howe Truss, a most excellent structure about five hundred yards long, and connecting Middle with West Tennessee. From the bridge we had a fine view of the river above and below, and we thought to ourself [sic] how great the change since old man Donelson and his fellow voyagers passed here, on their way from their settlements in East Tennessee to the “Bluffs” on the Cumberland, to found a habitation in the wilderness, of which Nashville is the legitimate offspring. What changes, what transformations, what developments have been made in eighty-five years!

It was here, too, that we saw some dozen or less hulks of boats, said to have been destroyed during the war by the rebel General Forrest.

Over the river, the road now leads through the Tennessee bottom, densely crowded with timber, and in some places through swamps studded with cypress knees and other growth. On, and on we go passing Willston, Camden, Hollow Rock, till the breakman cries out, Huntingdon! When we take a bird’s-eye of the capital of Carroll, one of the oldest looking towns in West Tennessee. It too, has been quite neglected by all the mechanics: mason, carpenter and unpainted. However, should the talked of railroad be constructed, connecting with Jackson, Tennessee, and thus forming a nearly direct line of railway from Nashville to New Orleans, Huntingdon will yet see better days. It seems to us that this is an important link, and that railroad men will not long delay its construction.

From Huntingdon we move on, stopping at Hico, a minute, to McKenzie, the point where the Memphis and Ohio and the Nashville and North-Western railways intersect each other; and also the dinner stand for the down trains, distant from this city one hundred and nineteen miles. The dinner was good, and the clerks are quite attentive, especially to the collection of bills. They do a safe business at this house, requiring passengers to pay in advance, acting upon the precaution couched in the homely couplet:

“Since man to man is so unjust!

We do not know what man to trust.”

All the seats were filed with busy occupants, none engaging in conversation, except a couple of wise-acres who talked knowingly, and related many things that “I did.” Mr. Pomposity has speculated in grain, investing some $8,000; and had all dealings with some “big house,” whose acquaintance he had formed through the “First National Bank!” What a happy medium through which to form acquaintances! A descendant of Abraham though the best way to make money now, was just to do nothing at all. He may be half right – don’t know. He vowed up by saying, “all whiskey distillers and large dealers are d____d rascals!” He knew “all about it.”

Here too, we took leave of a number of passengers, among them a couple who had talked much on the way down. One was an official of some West Tennessee County, and the other had wanted to go to Congress. He talked much; expostulated with the Sheriff about the innovations of his party; would suffer much; but before he would suffer a party to elevate the negro above him and his disfranchised friends, he would resist by any and all means within his power. The Sheriff admitted that there were some things which he did not approve, but thought they would adjust themselves after awhile, and all things would again move on smoothly. Although Maury has the lucky man, we confess Humphreys has the best looking man. We trust Mr. Arnell will take no exception at our decision as to the relative beauty of himself and his handsome competitor.

But the Louisville train has come and gone, and so away we go to Gleson [sic], and then on to Dresden, the capital of Weakley county, and a pleasant looking town at that. From this [point] on, the soil becomes better and better, and the towns and country residences wear a more pleasant appearance. Again we move on, stopping at Ralston, Gardiner and Raccoon, to Union City, in Obion county, where the Mobile and Ohio crosses the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, and from which place the New Orleans and Ohio railroad runs to Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee. These last named town are all new, and the latter promises much for the future, as a railroad point.

Leaving Union City, we move rapidly on, passing the State line, and a few minutes bring us to Hickman, in Fulton county, Ky., on the Mississippi, one hundred and seventy miles from the capital of Tennessee. Hickman is a new and thriving town, with a population variously estimated at from 1,500 to 2,500, and is located on a high and irregular bluff, overlooking the great “Father of Waters.” As to its probable future, we of course know but little. It appears to us to be the most direct, as well as the cheapest and speediest, route of transit for freights from New Orleans, St. Louis and other points, North and West, to Nashville. Should the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad some day change its western terminus to Columbus, Ky., to Pilot Knob, there connecting with the St. Louis and Iron Mountain road to the city of St. Louis, then Hickman would lose much of its importance, and would doubtless do but little business.

The Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, from this city to Johnsonville, a distance of seventy-eight miles, is an excellent road, having good ties and ballast. From Johnsonville to Hickman the road is good, but being new and for the most part without ballast, it is not in as excellent condition as the Eastern Division.

The completion of the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, which occurred in the month of August last, has given to our city a most valuable avenue of communication, which will grow in importance as time advances.

The uniting of the Capitol of Tennessee with the Mississippi will prove in time, of great moment in the direction of trade and commerce.

The road connects South and West, with the Illinois Central to Chicago, the Iron Mountain road to St. Louis, the Memphis and Ohio to Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio to Mobile and New Orleans. The road is in the hands of excellent officers, and every day adds to there business with it transacts. Connecting as it does, the Middle with the Western portion of the State, it is destined to become one of the most important and successful avenues of communication. We commend the road to the attention of the business and traveling public.

Stevenson, Vernon K. (1884): Vernon K Stevenson New York Times obituary

Mr. W.P . Bruce, general manager of the NC&St.L railway, who personally directed the work of rescue and the clearing away of the wreck yesterday issued the following card at noon today for the help extended by
all agencies during the mammoth work of yesterday.

"On the occasion of the disastrous collision yesterday near Nashville between two passenger trains on
the Nashville Chattanooga and St. Louis railway I personally observed the efficient assistance in taking care
of the injured and dead rendered by many passengers on the trains as well as by men and women who were not passengers. I have been told of many circumstances which I did not observe with reference to such
assistance. Many women went to the seen of the accident with their automobiles and transferred
the injured to hospitals and some business concerns sent their trucks to assist in the handling
the injured.

On behalf of myself as well as that of the railroad administration I desire to express my appreciation
for these kind acts on the part of the citizens of Nashville.

W P Bruce
General Manager

The transcript of the interview conducted by WP Borland
Chief, Bureau of safety, W P Bruce, Superintendent,
Nashville Terminals, and Mr. Ford and Mr. Waller of
The Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington D.C.
is a very old document and difficult to read.
It is currently being transcribed. The transcript
will be posted on this site in the near future.

In the document railroad employees who survived
the collision at Dutchman's Curve answer questions
about the accident.

The interviews conducted on July 13, 1918 resulted
in the ICC report that was submitted in August 1918.

INVESTIGATIONS OF RAILROAD ACCIDENTS 1911 - 1993

File Number 535
Railroad NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY
Date 07/09/1918
Location NASHVILLE, TN.
Accident Type N.E.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY COVERING THE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY AT NASHVILLE, TENN., ON JULY 9, 1918.

AUGUST 16, 1918.

To the Commission:

On July 9, 1918, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway at Nashville, Tenn., which resulted in the death of 87 passengers and 14 employees. and the injury of 87 passengers and 14 employees. After investigation the following report is submitted:

That part of the Nashville division of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway upon which this accident occurred is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time table and train orders, there being no block system in use. Between Nashville and Shops, a distance of 2.5 miles, it is a double-track line, and at Shops there is an interlocking plant which controls all main line switches there. The accident occurred about half way between Shops and Harding, located 2.5 and 6.8 mils, respectively, from the station at Nashville, and within the city limits of Nashville.

The trains involved in this accident are shown on the time table as southbound passenger train No. 1 and northbound passenger train No. 4, but in the vicinity of the point of accident, southbound trains run practically north and northbound trains practically south. Soutbound trains are superior to northbound trains. Train No. 4 is scheduled to leave Nashville at 7 a.m., and train No. 1 is scheduled to arrive at Nashville at 7.10 a.m.

Train No. 1 consisted of locomotive 281, one baggage car and five coached of wooden construction, one Pullman sleeping car of steel construction and one Pullman sleeping car with steel underframe and ends, in the order named, and was in charge of Conductor Tucker and Engineman Lloyd. It was enroute from Memphis to Nashville, being operated over the Louisville & Nashville Railroad from Memphis to McKenzie, and the remainder of the distance over the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway. It left McKenzie at 3 a.m., passed Bellevue, 12.6 miles from Nashville, at 7.09 a.m., 30 minutes late, and at about 7.20 a.m. collided head on with train No. 4 at a point about 4.5 miles from Nashville, while running at a speed estimated at about 50 miles an hour. Fig. 1 is a general view of the wreck.

Train No. 4 consisted of locomotive 282, one combination mail and baggage car, one baggage car and 6 coaches, in the order named and all of wooden construction, and was in charge of Conductor Eubank and Engineman Kennedy. At Nashville the crew received train order No. 29 reading as follows:

No. 4 engine 282, hold main track, meet No. 7, Eng. 215, at Harding. No. 1 has engine 281.

This train left Nashville at 7.07 a.m. 7 minutes late, passed Shops at 7.15 a.m., and collided with train No. 1 at a point about 2 miles beyond Shops while running at a speed estimated to have been about 50 miles an hour.

The engineman and firemen of both trains were killed. Locomotive 281 was derailed on the west side of the track, the boiler being stripped of cab, machinery and appurtenances, and came to rest in an upright position at an angle of about 45 degrees with the track; it is shown in Fig. 3. Its frame and all machinery were practically demolished. The baggage car was completely demolished. The first coach lay crosswise the track, the combination car of train No. 4 being driven into its side near the center and its rear end torn completely end to a depth of 12 or 15 feet. The second coach was derailed and its forward end went down the bank and rested on the front end of boiler of locomotive 281 and its rear and rested on the roadbed on top of the frame and other parts of locomotive 281, its forward end being badly broken and damaged. The third coach remained on the roadbed with its forward end jammed against the rear of the second coach; the rear trucks of this car and the four following cars were not derailed. All of this equipment was on train No. 1 Figs. 2, 3 and 4 are views of the destroyed equipment.

Locomotive 282 was derailed to the east side of the track, the boiler thrown from the frame and entirely stripped of all machinery and appurtenances and stopped about parallel with the track, the entire locomotive except the boiler being demolished, as shown by Fig. 3. The forward half of the combination car was demolished by coming in contact with the first coach of train No. 1. The baggage car was completely telescoped with the first coach to its rear, both cars remaining upright, but were practically destroyed, as shown by Fig 4. The end of the second coach was demolished for a distance of 6 or 8 feet and partially telescoped with the rear end of the coach ahead of it. The three rear cars of train No. 4 were not derailed and only slightly damaged.

Approaching the point of accident from Harding, the track is straight for about 1,800 feet, then there is a 1-degree curve to the right about 2,100 feet long, then a tangent about 1,100 feet long, then a 1-degree curve to the left about 1,300 feet long, then a tangent about 2,000 feet long, then a 2-degree curve to the right about 1,500 feet 2,000 feet long, then a 2-degree curve to the right about 1,500 feet long, the collision occurring about 900 feet in on this curve. The track just described is laid on a fill and a descending grade varying from 0.3 per cent to 0.7 per cent to within about 350 feet of the point of collision. and then the grade is practically level for about 2,000 feet. About 300 feet south of the point of collision, there is an over head highway bridge over the track and just south of the bridge there are heavy woods on the right hand side of the track.

Approaching the point of accident from the direction of Shops, the track is straight for approximately 4,000 feet, then there is a 3-degree curve to the left about 2,200 feet long, then a tangent about 1,000 feet long which leads to the 2-degree curve on which the collision occurred. The grade descends from 0.7 per cent to 1.3 per cent to within about 1,650 feet of the point of collision, and is practically level the remainder of the distance. Between Shops and the point of collision there are several cuts, one of which ends about 300 feet before reaching the point of collision, and has a maximum depth of 15 feet. This cut, the overhead highway bridge and the curve upon which the accident occurred made it practically impossible for the enginemen to see approaching trains is indicated by Fig. 5. The weather at the time was clear.

Dispatcher Phillips stated that when he missed train order No. 29 for train No. 4 to meet train No. 7, he added the information that train No. 1 was being hauled by locomotive 281, it being the custom to advise the crew of train No. 4 of the engine number of train No. 1 in this manner to aid then in identifying that train, and also to advise them that that train had not arrived at Shops. He said trains Nos. 1 and 4 are scheduled to pass on the double track between Nashville and Shops, and in case train No. 4 arrived at Shops before train No. 1, train No. 4 is expected to remain at Shops until train No. 1 arrives, unless the crew receives authority to proceed, train No. 1 being the superior train. He said there was no train register at Shops.

Conductor Eubank of train No. 4 stated that before leaving the station at Nashville, he received a train order advising that engine 281 was hauling train No. 1 and he delivered a copy of that order to Engineman Kennedy who read it back to him. He remarked to Engineman Kennedy that "No. 1 must be some late this morning, but I don't believe the mail is going to delay us so he will have to change that meeting point to Vaughns Gap," and from the remarks passed between them he supposed Engineman Kennedy knew their train was liable to be detained at Shops to meet train No. 1. Conductor Eubank stated that he read the train order to the train porter just as his train was leaving the station and shortly thereafter, and while his train was still on the double track, he delivered the order to the flagman and told him to look out for train No. 1. He said he knew train No. 1 had not arrived at Shops when he left Nashville and kept that train in mind. He was busy collecting tickets and before reaching the end of the double track, he heard a train pass his train on the opposite track, which he assumed was train No. 1, although he could not see it on account of the car in which he was riding being crowded. He said it took all his time and attention to collect the tickets before the next regular stop, and he was depending upon the engineman, fireman, porter and flagman to look out for train No. 1, as was his custom, and stop at Shops in case they did not pass that train. He stated that his train was running at a speed of about 45 miles an hour when he felt the application of the air brakes, followed immediately by the collision. He said he considered Engineman Kennedy careful man of good habits and when talking to him before leaving Nashville, he was apparently in good spirits and normal condition.

Flagman St. Clair of train No. 4 stated that when his train left Nashville, he was riding on the rear end and when it reached Shops he went forward, asked Conductor Eubank for the train orders, received them, but the conductor said nothing to him about looking out for train No. 1. He said a switch engine with 8 or 10 cars passed his train between Nashville and Shops, moving in the opposite direction, but saw no other trains. He said he had made but two trips as a flagman on a freight train, and this was his first trip as a passenger train flagman.

Conductor Tucker of train No. 1 stated that his train was running about 30 minutes late, and at a speed of 50 or 60 miles an hour, when the collision occurred, but he felt no application of the air brakes. He said he had received no orders concerning train No. 4, but it being an interior train, he expected it to wait at Shops until his train arrived.

Conductor Riggle, who alternated with Conductor Eubank on train No. 4, stated that he always kept train No. 1 in mind after leaving Nashville, and made it a special point not to pass Shops unless he personally knew that that train had arrived; on several occasions he had waited Shops until that train arrived. He said he depended upon the flagman, porter, and engine crew to identify train No. 1, but would not permit his train to pass Shops unless they advised him it had arrived, or he saw it.

Engineman Winford, who alternated with Engineman Kennedy on train No. 4, stated that it was sometimes necessary to wait at Shops until train No. 1 arrived. He said he usually finds the signals at Shops set for movement to the single track, but he always waited until the arrival of train No. 1, it being his understanding that the interlocking signals gave his train to rights over superior trains beyond Shops.

Operator Johnson stated that he went on duty at Shops at about 7.06 a.m. or 7.07 a.m., and train No. 4 passed the tower there about 7.15 a.m. at a speed of about 25 miles an hour. At that time he did not know whether train No. 1 had arrived, and did not examine the train sheet to see if it had; the first notice he had of its nonarrival was when he saw it was not entered on the train sheet. He said he reported the passage of train No. 4 promptly to the dispatcher, who told him to try and stop that train, as it should have waited for train No. 1, and he sounded the emergency air whistle in an effort to attract the attention of the crew of that train, which was then about a train length away, but the signal was not heeded. When train No. 4 approached the tower, the signal was in the proceed position, but he said that did not give it a right to proceed against train No. 1. He said nothing was said about train No. 1 when he took charge of the tower that morning.

Traveling Engineer Fahey stated that he considered Engineman Kennedy a very careful man, well posted on the rules, and one who adhered strictly to them. He said he bad observed engineman passing Shops upon the operator's word that superior trains had arrived, and as a result, the superintendent issued bulletin No. 1268 under date of May 28, 1918, reading as follows:

Understand some engineers on outbound trains are passing the Shops without any definite information as to whether superior trains have arrived, other than to ask operator at Shop tower. This must be discontinued.

Superior trains must either he registered before the northbound train depart or be identified by some member of the crew of the superior train, meet the superior train between Nashville and the Shops or have an order at the Shops stating that the superior has arrived.

NOTE. -- See that train dispatchers understand this and have the orders ready at the Shops so they can be handed on to the outbound trains.

This accident was caused by train No. 4 occupying the main track on the time of a superior train, for which Engineman Kennedy and Conductor Eubank were responsible.

Rule 83 of the operating rules of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway provides in part as follows:

A train must not leave its initial station or any division, or a junction or pass from double to single track, until it has been ascertained whether all trains due which are superior or of the some class, have arrived or left.

The evidence indicates that Engineman Kennedy and Conductor Eubank had been running on train No. 4 for several years and before leaving Nashville on the morning of the accident they had talked about train No. 1 and knew that it had not arrived, although it was due there at 7.10 a.m., three minutes after their train departed. As Engineman Kennedy was killed in the collision, no evidence could be secured to determine what caused him to overlook train No. 1.

Conductor Eubank apparently relied wholly upon the other members of the train crew to identify train No. 1 and allowed his train to pass from double track to single track at Shops without making any effort to ascertain whether train No. 1 had arrived. His statement that he was busy collecting tickets and that he passed a train in the yards between Nashville and Shops, which he did not see, but assumed was train No. 1, can not be considered a valid reason for overlooking of failing to identify that train. His first duty was to provide for the safety of his train and see to it that it did not pass from double track to single track before train No. 1 had arrived; and particularly in a yard where switching movements are constantly being made, he was extremely negligent in assuming that a passing train was No. 1 without seeing it and without being notified of its identify by some member of his crew who had seen it.

While the operating rules of the company required that a train must not pass from double to single track "until it has been ascertained whether all trains due, which are superior, or of the same class, have arrived or left," no means were provided by the company to enable employees to secure definite information of that character. That responsible operating officers were well aware of the conditions existing at Shops, as well as the fact that train employees were not strictly adhering to the requirements of the rule, is evidenced by the superintendent's bulletin No. 1268, issued last May. It appears that bulletin contemplated orders would be issued and delivered to outbound trains at Shops giving notice of superior trains which had arrived, but no practice of this nature was in effect. The custom of merely notifying outbound train crews of the number of the locomotive hauling an opposing superior train was utterly inadequate as a safeguard, for under the practices followed, the train crew was required to observe and correctly read the number of the passing locomotive under all conditions of weather and traffic.

The records show that during the month of June, on average of 23 trains daily were operated into and from Nashville over this division, and the number of yard movements materially increased the density of traffic between Nashville and Shops.

Under these circumstances, it is absolutely essential to safety that some means be provided for supplying to outbound crews definite information regarding opposing superior trains, as, for example, by the maintenance of a train register at Shops, or by issuing orders to outbound trains at Shops giving definite notice of the arrival at that point of superior trains which had not arrived at Nashville at the time of departure of the outbound trains.

This accident would have been prevented, beyond question of doubt, by a properly operated manual block system on the single-track line north of Shops, for which all necessary appliances and facilities were already available. The time table indicates that between Nashville and Hickman, Ky., a distance of approximately 172 miles, there are 27 train-order offices, of which 14 are continuously operated. On this line there are 4 schedules passenger train in each direction, and a total of 12 schedules freight trains. With this volume of traffic, and in view of the universally recognized features of increased safety afforded by the block system, there can be no valid excuse for the failure or neglect on the part of the railroad company to utilize existing facilities for the purpose of operating a block system on that line.

It is to be noted that all the cars of both trains, except the two sleeping cars on train No. 1, were of wooden construction, and six of these wooden cars were entirely destroyed. This accident presents a more appalling record of deaths and injuries than any other accident investigated by the Commission since the ancient-investigation work was begun in 1912. Had steel cars been used in these trains, the toll of human lives taken in this accident would undoubtedly have been very much less.

All of the employees involved were experienced men, with the exception of the flagman, with good records, and at the time of the accident the crew of train No. 4 had been on duty 52 minutes, and the crew of Train No. 1, 9 hours and 52 minutes.

Respectfully submitted.

W. P. BORLAND,

Chief, Bureau of Safety.

FIG. 1

GENERAL VIEW OF WRECK.

FIG. 2

VIEW OF DESTROYED EQUIPMENT.

FIG. 3

BOILERS OF LOCOMOTIVES 281 (TOP) AND 282 (BOTTOM).

FIG. 4

VIEW OF CARS AFTER BEING DRAWN APART, SHOWING BAGGAGE CAR AND FIRST COACH OF TRAIN NO. 4 TELESCOPED.

FIG. 5

VIEW OF TRACK AND OVERHEAD BRIDGE FROM DIRECTION TRAIN NO. 1 WAS TRAVELING.

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An Act To provide for the operation of transportation systems while under Federal control, for the just compensation of their owners, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted ..., That the President, having in time of war taken over the possession, use, control, and operation (called herein Federal control) of certain railroads and systems of transportation (called herein carriers), is hereby authorized to agree with and to guarantee to any such carrier making operating returns to the Interstate Commerce Commission, that during the period of such Federal control it shall receive as just compensation an annual sum, payable from time to time in reasonable instalments, for each year and pro rata for any fractional year of such Federal control, not exceeding a sum equivalent as nearly as may be to its average annual railway operating income for the three years ended... [June 30, 1917].

That any railway operating income accruing during the period of Federal control in excess of such just compensation shall remain the property of the United States... The average annual railway operating income shall be ascertained by the Interstate Commerce Commission and certified by it to the President.

Its certificate shall, for the purpose of such agreement, be taken as conclusive of the amount of such average annual railway operating income...

Every such agreement shall also contain adequate and appropriate provisions for the maintenance, repair, renewals, and depreciation of the property, for the creation of any reserves or reserve funds found necessary in connection therewith, and for such accounting and adjustments of charges and payments, both during and at the end of Federal control as may be requisite in order that the property of each carrier may be returned to it in substantially as good repair and in substantially as complete equipment as it was in at the beginning of Federal control, and also that the United States may, by deductions from the just compensations or by other proper means and charges, be reimbursed for the cost of any additions, repairs, renewals, and betterments to such property not justly chargeable to the United States...

The President is further authorized in such agreement to make all other reasonable provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or of the ... [Army Appropriation Act of August 29, 1916] ... that he may deem necessary or proper for such Federal control or for the determination of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement arising from or out of such Federal control.

If the President shall find that the condition of any carrier was during all or a substantial portion of the period of three years ended ... [June 30, 1917] ..., because of non-operation, receivership, or where recent expenditures for additions or improvements or equipment were not fully reflected in the operating railway income of said three years or a substantial portion thereof, or because of any undeveloped or abnormal conditions, so exceptional as to make the basis of earnings hereinabove provided for plainly inequitable as a fair measure of just compensation, then the President may make with the carrier such agreement for such amount as just compensation as under the circumstances of the particular case he shall find just.

That every railroad not owned, controlled, or operated by another carrier company, and which has heretofore competed for traffic with a railroad or railroads of which the President has taken possession, use, and control, or which connects with such railroads and is engaged as a common carrier in general transportation, shall be held and considered as within "Federal control," as herein defined, and necessary for the prosecution of the war, and shall be entitled to the benefit of all the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as including any street or interurban electric railway which has as its principal source of operating revenue urban, suburban, or interurban passenger traffic, or sale of power, heat and light, or both...

That if no agreement is made, or pending the execution of an agreement, the President may nevertheless pay to any carrier while under Federal control an annual amount, payable in reasonable instalments, not exceeding ninety per centum of the estimated annual amount of just compensation, remitting such carrier, in case where no agreement is made, to its legal rights for any balance claimed to the remedies provided in section three hereof.

Any amount thereafter found due such carrier above the amount paid shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum...

That all claims for just compensation not adjusted (as provided in section one) shall, on the application of the President or of any carrier, be submitted to boards, each consisting of three referees to be appointed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, members of which and the official force thereof being eligible for service on such boards without additional compensation...

The President is authorized to enter into an agreement with such carrier for just compensation upon a basis not in excess of that reported by such boards and may include therein provisions similar to those authorized under section one.

Failing such agreement, either the United States or such carrier may file a petition in the Court of Claims for the purpose of determining the amount of such just compensation, and in the proceedings in said court the report of said referees shall be prima facie evidence of the amount of just compensation and of the facts therein stated.

Proceedings in the Court of Claims under this section shall be given precedence and expedited in every practicable way.

That the just compensation that may be determined as hereinbefore provided by agreement or that may be adjudicated by the Court of Claims, shall be increased by an amount reckoned at a reasonable rate per centum to be fixed by the President upon the cost of any additions and betterments, less retirements, and upon the cost of road extensions to the property of such carrier made by such carrier with the approval of or by order of the President while such property is under Federal control.

That no carrier while under Federal control shall, without the prior approval of the President, declare or pay any dividend in excess of its regular rate of dividends during the three years ended ... [June 30, 1917] ...: Provided, however, That such carriers as have paid no regular dividends or no dividends during said period may, with the prior approval of the President, pay dividends at such rate as the President may determine.

That the sum of $500,000,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, which, together with any funds available from any operating income of said carriers, may be used by the President as a revolving fund for the purpose of paying the expenses of the Federal control, and so far as necessary the amount of just compensation, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars, and other necessary equipment, such terminals, motive power, cars, and equipment to be used and accounted for as the President may direct and to be disposed of as Congress may hereafter by law provide.

The President may also make or order any carrier to make any additions, betterments, or road extensions, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars, and other equipment necessary or desirable for war purposes or in the public interest on or in connection with the property of any carrier.

He may from said revolving fund advance to such carrier all or any part of the expense of such additions, betterments, or road extensions, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars, and other necessary equipment so ordered and constructed by such carrier or by the President, such advances to be charged against such carrier and to bear interest at such rate and be payable on such terms as may be determined by the President, to the end that the United States may be fully reimbursed for any sums so advanced.

Any loss claimed by any carrier by reason of any such additions, betterments, or road extensions so ordered and constructed may be determined by agreement between the President and such carrier; failing such agreement the amount of such loss shall be ascertained as provided in section three hereof.

From said revolving fund the President may expend such an amount as he may deem necessary or desirable for the utilization and operation of canals, or for the purchase, construction, or utilization and operation of boats, barges, tugs, and other transportation facilities on the inland, canal, and coastwise waterways, and may in the operation and use of such facilities create or employ such agencies and enter into such contracts and agreements as he shall deem in the public interest.

That for the purpose of providing funds requisite for maturing obligations or for other legal and proper expenditures, or for reorganizing railroads in receivership, carriers may, during the period of Federal control, issue such bonds, notes, equipment trust certificates, stock, and other forms of securities, secured or unsecured by mortgage, as the President may first approve as consistent with the public interest.

The President may, out of the revolving fund created by this Act, purchase for the United States all or any part of such securities at prices not exceeding par, and may sell such securities whenever in his judgment it is desirable at prices not less than the cost thereof.

That the President may execute any of the powers herein and heretofore granted him with relation to Federal control through such agencies as he may determine, and may fix the reasonable compensation for the performance of services in connection therewith, and may avail himself of the advice, assistance, and cooperation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the members and employees thereof, and may also call upon any department, commission, or board of the Government for such services as he may deem expedient.

But no such official or employee of the United States shall receive any additional compensation for such services except as now permitted by law.

That during the period of Federal control, whenever in his opinion the public interest requires, the President may initiate rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices by filing the same with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall not be suspended by the commission pending final determination.

Said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be reasonable and just and shall take effect at such time and upon such notice as he may direct, but the Interstate Commerce Commission shall, upon complaint, enter upon a hearing concerning the justness and reasonableness of so much of any order of the President as establishes or changes any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice of any carrier under Federal control...

In determining any question concerning any such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, or practices or changes therein, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall give due consideration to the fact that the transportation systems are being operated under a unified and coordinated national control and not in competition.

After full hearing the commission may make such findings and orders as are authorized by the Act to regulate commerce as amended, and said findings and orders shall be enforced as provided in said Act...

That moneys and other property derived from the operation of the carriers during Federal control are hereby declared to be the property of the United States.

Unless otherwise directed by the President, such moneys shall not be covered into the Treasury, but such moneys and property shall remain in the custody of the same officers, and the accounting thereof shall be in the same manner and form as before Federal control.

Disbursements therefrom shall, without further appropriation, be made in the same manner as before Federal control and for such purposes as under the Interstate Commerce Commission classification of accounts in force on ... [December 27, 1917] ... are chargeable to operating expenses or to railway tax accruals and for such other purposes in connection with Federal control as the President may direct...

That the Federal control of railroads and transportation systems herein and heretofore provided for shall continue for and during the period of the war and for a reasonable time hereafter, which shall not exceed one year and nine months next following the date of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace- Provided, however, That the President may, prior to ... [July 1, 1918] ... relinquish control of all or any part of any railroad or system of transportation, further Federal control of which the President shall deem not needful or desirable; and the President may at any time during the period of Federal control agree with the owners thereof to relinquish all or any part of any railroad or system of transportation.

The President may relinquish all railroads and systems of transportation under Federal control at any time he shall deem such action needful or desirable. No right to compensation shall accrue to such owners from and after the date of relinquishment for the property so relinquished.

That nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend, repeal, impair, or affect the existing laws or powers of the States in relation to taxation or the lawful police regulations of the several States, except wherein such laws, powers, or regulations may affect the transportation of troops, war materials, Government supplies, or the issue of stocks and bonds.

That this Act is expressly declared to be emergency legislation enacted to meet conditions growing out of war; and nothing herein is to be construed as expressing or prejudicing the future policy of the Federal Government concerning the ownership, control, or regulation of carriers or the method or basis of the capitalization thereof.